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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs . ; 
CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 930659-CA 
Trial Court No. 842022686 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The modification of the Divorce Decree from which this 
appeal is taken was signed by the Court on September 2, 1993. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed September 29, 1993. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this matter 
by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et 
seq., Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-1 et seq., and Rule 3 R. Utah Ct. 
App. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a modification of divorce decree 
signed and entered by Judge Gordon J. Low of the First Judicial 
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred, given the occupation Mr. 
Welling maintained during the marriage of the parties which he 
specifically changed following the divorce to assume the new 
responsibility for a second family which now requires him to work 
substantially more hours per week and assume more responsibility 
and risk with the extra money received based on commissions in 
setting Mr, Wellingfs earnings for the purpose of setting child 
support for the first family at $7,000 per month rather than the 
$3,000 a month he would have earned had he remained in the same 
type of employment with the same general duties and a normal 40-
hour working week he was doing at the time of the divorce. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Welling 
any attorney fees and costs without finding she was unable to pay 
her own attorney fees and costs, especially in light of the 
arrearage judgment for child support based on the retroactive 
date of the order which would have given her sufficient money to 
pay her attorney and costs. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a modification of a divorce decree. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The parties were originally divorced on October 24, 1984. A 
modification of the divorce decree was entered September 2, 1993, 
and an appeal of the child support and costs of court was filed 
September 29, 1993. 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial was held on December 2, 1992. After the 
presentation of the evidence and the hearing of testimony of the 
parties and Mr. Wellingfs supervisor, the trial court found that 
Mr. Wellingfs income for the last three years had averaged $7,000 
per month. The court further found as immaterial the fact that 
Mr. Welling had maintained a job during the marriage which 
required the normal 40-hour week and generated $22,000 per year 
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in earnings and because of a conscious choice he made to be able 
to assume the responsibility for a second family had changed to a 
job that required a minimum of 60 hours per week and had a base 
salary of $33,000 which was comparable to his prior earnings but 
generated substantially more earnings based on commissions that 
were dependant on the risk of success and the greatly increased 
working hours per week. The court further found Mrs. Welling was 
voluntarily under-employed and imputed her wages at $1,075 per 
month based on the prior job she maintained. The court found the 
effective date of the order to be February 1, 1992, thus creating 
an arrearage from that date to the date of the hearing. 
The court found that Mr. Welling?s earnings represented 87% 
of the earnings of the parties and ordered him to pay 87% of the 
attorney fees and costs incurred, or his own attorney fees and 
costs plus $590 of attorney fees and costs to Mrs. Welling?s 
attorney. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced on October 24, 1984. 
2. During the course of the marriage, two children were 
born to the parties, to-wit: Michael Welling, born October 30, 
1982, and Brandon Welling, born April 25, 1984. 
3. That during this marriage and at the time of the 
divorce, Mr. Welling was employed as a management trainee at J.C. 
Penneyfs where he earned $22,593 in 1984, the year of the 
divorce. (See Exhibit "A" admitted at the hearing and attached 
hereto as Exhibit 1, and Trial Transcript, page 8, lines 5-16. ) 
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4. That for the next two years, Mr. Welling made less than 
he did in 1984 while trying different jobs but paid his child 
support regularly and paid all of the marital debts that he had 
assumed in the divorce. (See Exhibit 1.) 
5. That Mr. Welling wanted to earn additional money to 
support a new wife and family, but rather than choose a regular 
full-time job with a part-time job to supplement his earnings, he 
began working as a traveling salesman which required at least 60 
hours per week with the added responsibility of travel with a 
guaranteed base salary to protect his first family with all the 
excess earnings conditioned on performance in the form of a 
bonus. 
6. That Mr. Welling remarried in 1990 and is the father of 
a child born in 1992 as a result of that relationship. He has 
continued to make approximately $33,000 per year as a base 
guaranteed salary plus bonuses based on the extra hours of work 
and successful performance. (See Exhibit 1.) 
7. That the other salesmen working for the same company 
doing the same general work make between $50,000 and $60,000 
based on their base plus bonuses with an average of 60-hours per 
week work. (See Trial Transcript, page 45, lines 1-6.) 
8. That Mrs. Welling has worked one and a half years since 
the divorce and spent the balance of the time going to college. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. That as a result of the trial court's failure to 
adequately differentiate the earnings of Mr. Welling between a 
base salary of $33,000 which he is guaranteed and comparable with 
the regular full-time job he performed during the marriage of the 
parties by which their children would have been supported had the 
parties stayed married and the excess earnings in the form of a 
bonus generated by his increased efforts and assumption of risk 
in making those earnings, which he assumed after the divorce to 
be able to support his new family, the court improperly set child 
support using a wrong income earnings for Mr. Welling. 
2. That the court erred in awarding Mrs. Welling $590 of 
attorney fees and costs when there was no evidence of her need 
and where she was awarded an arrearage judgment large enough to 
cover those costs because of the retroactive nature of the order. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING ALL OF MR. 
WELLING1S SALARY, MUCH OF WHICH WAS GENERATED BY 
WORKING EXCESS HOURS PER WEEK AND BY ASSUMING 
RISKS IN HOW HE WAS PAID AT A NEW JOB SPECIFICALLY 
TAKEN AFTER THE DIVORCE SO HE COULD SUPPORT A 
SECOND FAMILY. 
Utah law is very clear that for the purposes of setting 
child support, "income from earned income sources is limited to 
the equivalent of one full-time job." (emphasis added) Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2). 
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There is no legislative definition or Utah court decisions 
that clarify what is meant by "equivalent of one full-time job." 
Legislative history is also silent on the meaning of that 
phrase, except the term "40-hour" which was included in Sub. HB 
203 between the word "one" and the word "full-time" as it passed 
the House in 1989, was deleted by a voice vote on the floor of 
the Senate on the 44th day of the session by a motion of the 
undersigned just prior to the bill being approved by the full 
Senate. (See Utah State Senate Journal 1989, page 754.) This 
amendment was later accepted by the House. There is no 
explanation on the record for the purpose and intent of this 
amendment, but the undersigned was a member of the Child Support 
Guidelines Task Force chaired by Judge Judith Billings that 
created the basis from which these guidelines were created. (See 
Child Support Guidelines, Utah Law Review 1990, beginning page 
859.) The undersigned made the motion because the "40-hour" 
limitation was too narrow for jobs where over 40 hours were 
regularly expected and worked during a marriage which established 
a lifestyle of support of income upon which the family and the 
children were funded. On the other hand, the term "equivalent" 
limited the term "full-time work" to a reasonable comparable to 
what other people normally do to support their family. If only 
"full-time job" had been used, there could be no such comparison. 
If a type of job only required 10 hours a week or even 90 hours a 
week, it could be still considered "full-time" but certainly not 
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equivalent to other jobs unless the time set to earn the wages 
are equivalent to what a 40-hour week would normally generate. 
The Court is left to the standard rules of statutory 
construction, that is: the plain meaning of the term taken 
within the context of the statute involved as historically 
applied and which fosters good social policy should be followed. 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984). 
For most people not self-employed, "full-time" would normally be 
measured by 40 hours. Generally anyone who works for another is 
paid extra for anything over 40 hours as overtime because time 
beyond that is not generally expected or required. 
It is submitted that "equivalent of one full-time job" 
should generally be 40 hours unless the job in question normally 
requires a limited number of hours beyond that. The historical 
work pattern established and expected during the marriage should 
be considered. In other words, if a parent normally works four 
hours of overtime per week during the marriage where such 
overtime is expected or required and is generally available, that 
should be the standard. If the parent is working an excessive 
number of hours per week, say ten or more, especially in an 
effort to earn additional moneys to try to save the marriage, the 
court should follow the more reasonable level of the 40-hour week 
rather than hold the worker to the extraordinary schedule which 
is assured for a short specific purpose. The object of the large 
number of hours--to save the marriage--is now lost to the divorce 
and the short duration of the excess work should not be a penalty 
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to the spouse as he tries to begin a new life. If a parent 
voluntarily changes occupations after the divorce, so that he 
works extraordinary longer hours and makes more money to be able 
to assume the responsibility for a new family, he should be able 
to do that as long as his first family is protected by child 
support based on the same earnings they were receiving during the 
marriage. Each parent should be able to voluntarily help 
whomever they want just as they could choose to give one child 
more during their marriage. 
This statutory policy to cap or limit the number of hours a 
person must work to support his children after a divorce is 
consistent with two other principles of law in this area. There 
is no limit on the income to be considered if it comes from non-
earned sources. In other words, if the parent inherited money 
that generated income, the full amount could be considered by the 
court in setting child support. This appears reasonable because 
those earnings are not set by time of effort, which is limited to 
everyone. Also, if a person chooses to work a 40-hour job plus a 
second part-time job of 20 hours, only the income from the first 
would be considered. It does not make any rational sense to say, 
but if instead of two separate jobs, a parent expanded one job 
from 40 to 60 hours, the full amount in earnings are included to 
set child support. 
It is difficult to compare this provision with the laws of 
other states because the exact wording, approach and policy 
behind them are different. ("Child Support Guidelines, 1990 ULR, 
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page 859). This article, written by Judge Billings after she 
chaired the Utah Judicial Council's Child Support Guidelines Task 
Force, gives the considerations by the group in creating the work 
product which became Sub HB 203 of the 1989 session. Judge 
Billings explains what approach the task force accepted and why: 
The Task Force ultimately decided that the 
guidelines that considered both parents' incomes 
would be perceived as more fair and would better 
reflect the underlying policy that both parents 
should contribute to the well-being of their 
children. 
Page 888. 
With this approach, the statute protects the children and 
the parents by capping earned income at the equivalent of a full-
time job and by setting a floor by imputing wages for 
unemployment and under-employment. 
Other states have faced the challenges of a non-custodial 
parent whose unusual rigorous work schedule has set income at an 
abnormally high level. In re Marriage of Simpson, 14 Cal. 
Rept.2d 411, 841 P.2d 931 (Cal. 1992). The Supreme Court of 
California acknowledged that a reasonable work regimen, not an 
extraordinary regimen, should be the goal is applying the 
guidelines under the statutory term of "earning capacity", which 
is certainly less restructive than "equivalent of one full-time 
job." 
The record in this case is not as clear as intended because 
the trial court limited much of the case by deciding the issues 
during the opening statements and allowed much by proffer (page 
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30). The trial court had clearly made up its mind during the 
opening statement that the full earnings of Mr. Welling were 
going to be included, regardless of how they were made and the 
reason for his extraordinary work schedule as long as it was from 
one employer. The task in such a case is not easy or clear, but 
the California Court set forth the guidelines we should follow: 
A reasonable work regimen, as opposed to an 
extraordinary regimen, however, is not readily or 
precisely determined and is dependent upon all 
relevant circumstances, including the choice of 
job available within a particular occupation, 
working hours, and working conditions. 
Established employment norms, such as the standard 
40-hour work week, are not controlling but are 
pertinent to this determination. In certain 
occupations a normal work week necessarily will 
require in excess of 40 hours or occasional 
overtime and thus perhaps an amount of time and 
effort which may be considered reasonable under 
the circumstances. A regimen requiring excessive 
hours or continuous, substantial overtime, 
however, generally should be considered 
extraordinary. 
Page 937. 
The point missed by the trial court is that Mr. Welling 
carried a traditional full-time 40-hour job during the marriage 
of the parties. It was what he had been trained to do and was 
the choice of the parties upon which to base their lifestyle 
expectancy for the rest of their married life. They begat 
children and proceeded with that expectation until the divorce. 
Defendant left that job and voluntarily secured another type of 
employment to earn the money necessary to pay all the marital 
debts and still maintain his support payments. He made sure the 
children were supported as ordered and gave extra support as he 
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was able. He then developed a new occupation with the risk that 
his salary other than the base was no longer guaranteed and his 
work schedule would clearly exceed the normal 40-hours by an 
extraordinary amount. He did this by choice so he could assume 
responsibility for a new family. The trial court rejected this 
position at the beginning of the hearing and made it clear that 
he was not going to allow this father that choice. The trial 
court made the children from the first marriage beneficiaries of 
this extraordinary work pattern. Even Mr. Wellingfs offer in 
settlement of accepting a $65,000 annual salary as his expected 
earnings so the commitments of his second family could be met was 
not accepted by the court. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT WITHOUT A FINDING THAT SHE 
WAS IN NEED OF SUCH AN AWARD. 
An award of attorney fees at a trial must be based on 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fee. See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 
1991). The trial court failed to address Mrs. Welling?s need. 
In fact, she was awarded an arrearage judgment solely based on 
the retroactive effective date of the order. The final papers 
signed September 2, 1993, some nine months after the hearing, 
reflect that Mrs. Welling after the December 2, 1992 hearing was 
paid $4,170 on the arrearage of $7,711, leaving a balance owing 
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of $3,541, thus providing her with ample funds to pay the $1,000 
in attorney fees and costs the court found reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
This case will allow the Utah law to be clarified as to what 
is meant by the limit on earned income to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. This case shows a man who has changed his 
occupation after the divorce and voluntarily assume an 
extraordinary schedule of hours worked and risks of salary 
assumed. This is certainly more than the equivalent of one full-
time job both by past work schedule and what is normal person 
expected. His first family should be supported as they were 
accustomed and expected by his base salary but to punish this 
father's sacrifice to support a second family is not equitable. 
Mrs. Welling has funds to pay her own attorney fees and costs and 
the court made no finding otherwise. Therefore, this Court 
should reduce Mr. Wellingfs earned income to $33,000 per year his 
guaranteed base for the purpose of setting child support and find 
that no award of attorney fees and costs to Mrs. Welling should 
be made. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f day of February, 1994. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
IiYLEj W. H I L L Y A R © 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, postpaid, to the 
day of February, 1994: 
David M. Cole 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
330 North Main Street 
P. 0. Box 320 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
#LE ¥. HI 
ttorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
JYARD 
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Lyle W-- -illyard #1494 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, UT 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
ATTACHMENT A 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 842022686 
BASED on the Court's Memorandum Decision dated the 6th day 
of August, 1993, it is hereby Ordered: 
1. That Exhibit A of Defendant's Petition be modified as 
shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit D and be submitted to the Court for 
signature, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to this order 
and by this signing shall become entered by the court as its 
order in the December 2, 1992, hearing. 
2. That Defendant's request for additional attorneys fees 
and costs is denied and Plaintiff's request that attorneys fees 
be abated is also denied. 
3. That Defendant's request for a wage assignment is 
denied. ^ 
Dated this ^ day of "^ glfiftf^ 1993. 
BY THE COUF 
MICROFILMED 
OATE: P/V?? 
LOW 
District Court Judge 
.;~>fc 
*G 
21993 t 
s>. n OA^5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's attorney, 
Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 300, 
Ogden, Utah 84403, this /3 day of August, 19£3. 
Secretary • Vf 
e:\lwh\pl\welling.orl 
-?.- ono 
EXHIBIT 'A1 
Lyle W. Hillyard #1494 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, UT 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 842022686 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on 
Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce before the 
Honorable Judge Gordon J* Low in the above-entitled court on the 
2nd day of December, 1992, at 9 o'clock a.m. Defendant was 
personally present and represented by Jean Robert Babilis of Jean 
Robert Babilis & Associates and the Plaintiff was personally 
present and represented by Lyle W. Hillyard of Hillyard, Anderson 
& Olsen. The Judge having heard testimony taken, the Court does 
make and enter the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded 
one-half, or five (5) weeks, of the children's summer vacation. 
The court eliminates the first and last week of summer, which 
leaves ten (10) weeks to be divided equally between the parties 
21993 
The same formula applies to Christmas and other major holidays* 
In addition, the court finds that due to the great geographical 
distance between the parties, the Plaintiff should be awarded 
visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant 
reasonable notice of no less than two weeks where possible, when 
he is in town* The parties should generally follow the 
recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached 
visitation guidelines* 
2. the court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the 
use of her pre-marital surname, to-wit: MORRIS. 
3. The court finds that the Plaintiff provided the 
Defendant with a 1988 Oldsmobile in exchange for the right to 
claim the parties' two children as dependents for tax purposes 
for the years through 1990 through 1995. 
4. The court finds that the Plaintiff's income has averaged 
$84,000.00 over the past three years, and therefore, that is the 
figure to be used when calculating child support for the parties' 
two minor children. The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed, and 
the court finds that she is capable of earning $1,075.00 for 
purposes of computing child support. The court finds that the 
Plaintiff has remarried, has a child born as issue of his current 
marriage, and incurs work-related day care expenses. 
5. The court finds that the Defendant should be granted a 
judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven 
Hundred Eleven Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00) for child support 
arrearages from February 1, 1992 through and including the month 
2 
of December, 1992, which represents the amount above and beyond 
the original child support order of $300,00 per month, which has 
been made by the Plaintiff. 
6. The court finds that the Defendant's attorney's fees are 
approximately One Thousand Dollars and no/100 ($1,000.00), and 
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees are Two Thousand Dollars and 
no/100 ($2,000.00). The Plaintiff earns eighty seven percent 
(87%) of the parties' combined gross incomes, and therefore 
should pay (87%) of the attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting 
this action, and therefore, Defendant is granted a judgment 
against the Plaintiff of $590.00 for attorney's fees. 
Based on the above and foregoing, and for good cause 
appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Decree of Divorce entered October 24, 1984, may be modified as 
follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half, or five (5) weeks, of 
the children's summer vacation. The Plaintiff is awarded 
visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant 
reasonable notice of at least two weeks where possible of when he 
will be in town. The parties should generally follow the 
recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached 
visitation guidelines. 
2. The Defendant is awarded the use of her pre-marital 
surname, to-wit: MORRIS. 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded the right to claim the parties 
two children as dependents for tax purposes for the years through 
3 
1990 through 1995 in exchange for a 1988 Oldsmobile. Thereafter, 
the tax dependency of the children shall belong to the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff may have the option to buy the exemptions, so long 
as he is current and timely in his child support payments each 
year, by paying to the Defendant the tax loss by not being able 
to claim the children on her and her future husband's tax returns 
each year. The parties are ordered to exchange tax returns and 
indicate their incomes and work histories. 
4. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support in the sum 
of Five Hundred Dollars and 50/100 ($500.50) per month per child, 
or One Thousand One Dollar and no/100 ($1,001.00) per month, 
beginning with the month of February, 1992. Said child support 
is due one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th of each 
month, and shall terminate when each child turns eighteen (18) 
years of age or graduate with their regular high school class, 
whichever occurs last. 
5. The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the 
Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven 
Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00), minus Four Thousand One Hundred 
Seventy Dollars and no/100 ($4,170.00) which he paid in December, 
1992, as and for child support arrearages from February 1, 1992, 
to and including the month of December, 1992, which represents 
the amount above and beyond the original child support order of 
$300.00 per month, for a total judgment of Three Thousand Five 
Hundred Forty One Dollars and no/100 ($3,541.00). 
4 
6. The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the 
Plaintiff in the amount of Five Hundred Ninety Dollars and no/100 
($590.00) as and for a contribution toward Defendant's attorney's 
fees and costs in bringing this action. 
7. All prior orders of this court not modified herein shall 
remain in full force and effect. 
Dated this _^{ day 
BY THE COUR' 
)'RD0ft J/ LOW 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's 
attorney, Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 
300, Ogden, Utah 84403, this day of August, 1993. 
Secretary 
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Exhibit "A" 
Income History 
ATTACHMENT B 
Wendell 
Base Salary 
Bonus 
Total 
Base Salary 
Bonus 
Penney's 
1984 
$22,593.08 
0 
$22,593.08 
Ethicon 
1988 
$29,000 
9.003 
Lever 
1985 
$18,000 
3.615 
$21,615 
Ethicon 
1989 
$28,424 
12.565 
Lever 
1986 
$19,000 
2.422 
$21,422 
Ethicon 
1990 
$31,304 
32.815 
Olympic 
1987 
$29,000 
4.100 
$33,100 
Ethicon 
1991 
$33,358 
39.120 
Total $38,003 $40,989 $64,119 $72,478 
Base Salary 
Bonus 
Total 
1992 YTD 
$ 32,640 
66.890 
$ 99,530 
